Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1965

In the Matter of the General Determination of All
the Rights To the Use of Water, Both Surface and
Underground, Within the Drain Age Area of the
Green River Above the Confluence of, but
Including Pot Creek, In Daggett, Summit and
Uintah Counties, Utah : Brief of Respondents

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Phil L. Hanse, Dallin W. Jensen, E.J. Skeen, Lee S. Nebeker,
Hugh W. Colton, and Dwight L. King; Attorneys for respondents
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, In Re: Green River Adjudication v. USA, No. 10284 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3544

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

_,:;,..·

-

--

----

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UfAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATlON OF ALL
THE RIGHTS TO THE USE OF
WATER, BOTH SURFACE AND
UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE
DRAIN AGE AREA OF THE
GREEN RIVER ABOVE THE CONFLUENCE OF, BUT INCLUDING
POT CREEK, IN DAGGETT, S~
MIT AND UINTAH COUNTIE
UTAH.
BRIEF OF

e
.•

., . ,J'\J;~ ..
...
··, -··,
. ·: :,,.

RESPONDENTS,A~ •:,·
------.,:

Appeal from the Judgment off.i8
Third District Court for ~ · · ··
Hon. A. H. Ellett, Judge : .

'»\.;,;.

PHIL L. HANSEN,
Attorney General,
DALLIN W. JENSEN,
Assistant Attorney General.
Attorneys for RespcmdeD.t,
State Engineer.

E. J. SKEEN,
52!2 Newhouse Building,
Salt Lake Oity, Utah,
Attorney for Respondents.
J. R. Broadbent, Joe lfickey,
Cal Hickey, Jewel ~
Bud Huseman, Keith Bvans.
Claude Bullock and Edpr
Donohoo.

J. EDW.ARD W'IlUAMB,
Act:iag Assistant Attorney General,
W'BUAM T. THURMAN,
United St.ates Attorney,

Salt lake City, Utah 84101,
ROGER P. MARQmB,
mMUN!D B. CLARK,

Attorneys, Department of Justice,

WIUlldnltOn, D. C. 20630,

Attorneys for Appellant.

.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

NATURE OF THE CASE ----------------------------------------------

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT------------------------------

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ----------------------------------

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------------------

2

ARGUMENT ----------------------------------------------------------------------

6

POINT I. THE DECREE OF THE DISTRICT
COURT, IN CONFORMANCE WITH SECTION
73-4-12, U. C. A., 1953, AWARDS TO APPELLANT ALL OF THE RIGHTS TO THE USE OF
WATER TO WHICH APPELLANT ESTABLISHED A RIGHT IN THIS ADJUDICATION
PROCEEDING ----------------------------------------------------------

6

A.

B.

C.

...

D.

THE PLEADINGS APPELLANT FILED
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT DO NOT
ALLEGE ANY CLAIM TO THE USE OF
WATER UNDER THE RESERVATION
THEORY ------------------------------------------------------------

6

THE PROPOSED DETERMINATION AND
THE DECREE OF THE DISTRICT COURT
ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
UPON WHICH THE COURT COULD BASE
THE AWARD OF AN ADDITION AL
WATER RIGHT TO APPELLANT IN THIS
PROCEED IN GS ------------------------------------------------

11

APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A DETERMINATION BY THIS COURT OF
RIGHTS UNDER THE RESERVATION
THEORY PRESENTS TO THIS COURT
AN ABSTRACT, MOOT ISSUE --------------------

18

'QIE AWARDS TO NEBEKER UNDER
WATER USERS' CLAIMS NOS. 265, 2716,
2718 AND 2719 DO NOT CONFLICT WITH

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued

Page

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR'S
ADMINISTRATION OF LANDS UNDER
THE TAYLOR GRAZING ACT ---------------------- 20
CON CLUSI 0 N --------------------------------------------------------------------

21

AUTHORITIES CITED

5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, § 491 ------------------------

10

5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, § 762 ------------------------

19

CASES CITED

Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546 (1963) ----------------

13

Arizona v. California, 376 U. S. 340 ( 1964) ----------------

11

Gunnison Irr. Co. v. Gunnison H. C. Co., 52 Utah 347,
17 4 P. 852 ( 1918) ----------------------------------------------------

14

Hardy v. Beaver County Irr. Co., 65 Utah 28, 234 P.
524 ( 1924) ------------------------------------------------------------------

8

Huntsville Irrigation Association v. District Court of
Weber County, 72 Utah 431, 270 P. 1090 (1928) __ 17
LaRue v. Udall, 324 F. 2d 428 (1963) ----------------------------

20

Mammoth Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Burton, 70 Utah
239, 259 P. 408 ( 1927) ____________________________________________ 8, 16
Osborne v. United States, 145 F. 2d 292 (1944) ________

20

Plain City Irr. Co. v. Hooper Irr. Co., 87 Utah 545, 51
p. 2d 1069 ( 1935) ------------------------------------------------------

15

Smith v. District Court of Second Judicial District for
Morgan County, 69 Utah 493, 256 P. 539 (1927) __

16

United States v. Cox, 190 F. 2d 293 (1951) __________________ 20
United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F. 2d 334
( 1939) -------------------------------------------------------------------------· 11

-TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued

Page

Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. AllisChalmers Workers Union, Local 248, 32 N. W. 2d
190 ( 1948) ------------------------------------------------------------------

19

Yardley v. Swapp, 12 Utah 2d 146, 364 P. 2d 4 (1961)

10

STATUTES CITED

43

u. s. c.

§ 666 --------------------------------------------------------------

3

Utah Code Annotated 1953
Section 73-4-1 ------------------------------------------------------------ 2, 7
Section 73-4-5 ------------------------------------------------------------ 3, 7
Section 73-4-6

3

Section 73-4-7

3

Section 73-4-8

3

Section 73-4-11

4

Section 73-4-12 ---------------------------------------------------------- 15
Section 73-4-14 __________________________________________________________ 8, 12
Section 73-4-15 ----------------------------------------------------------

15

REPORTS

Report of the Special Master in Arizona v. California,
Tm U. S. 546 (1963) dated December 5, 1960 ______

13

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION OF ALL
THE RIGHTS TO THE USE OF
WATER, BOTH SURFACE AND
UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE
DRAIN AGE AREA OF THE
GREEN RIVER ABOVE THE CONFLUENCE OF, BUT INCLUDING
POT CREEK, IN DAGGETT, SUMMIT AND UINTAH COUNTIES,
UTAH.

Case No.

10284

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This action is for a general determination of the rights
to the use of water pursuant to Chapter 4, Title 73, U. C.
A., 1953. The water source covered by this proceeding includes all of the drainage area of the Green River, both
surface and underground, above the confluence of, but including Pot Creek, in Daggett, Summit and Uintah Counties, Utah.
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The respondent State Engineer would like to make it
clear at the outset that his position in a general adjudication proceeding is that of a state administrative officer
and not as one water user against another.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was heard before the District Court in the
Third Judicial District, the Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge,
upon appellant's objections to the proposed determiRation
of water rights and the answer of the State Engilleer. Insofar as this appeal is concerned, the water users claims
filed by the appellant were confirmed as contained in the
proposed determination with the exception of Award Number 14 in the decree of September 25, 1964, which involves
water users' claim numbers 265, 2716, 2718 and 2719. Certain other awards were made between appellant and others
in the decree, but these are not involved in this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents submit that the decision of the District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents submit that the following statement
of facts is a more correct statement of the evidence actually
before the District Court than is contained in appellant's
brief, viewed as it must be in a light most favorable to the
decision of the District Court. This action was initiated
upon petition of water users in 1948 as provided for in
Section 73-4-1, U. C. A., 1953, and subsequently, in 1953,
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it was enlarged to cover the present area. (See the general
findings prefacing the specific awards in each copy of the
proposed determination, Volumes 5 and 6 of the record.)
Appellant was made a party to the action pursuant to 43
U. S. C. § 666, and originally filed 715 separate water users
claims setting forth in detail the rights to the use of water
claimed. Subsequently some additional claims were submitted. (Volumes 2, 3 and 4 of the record.) Each of these
water users claims set forth the origin of the right, point
of diversion, period of use, nature of use, priority, extent
and place of use and such other material as will completely
define the right claimed as is provided for in Section 734-5, U. C. A., 1953. (Sections 6, 7 and 8 specify certain
additional information for the uses specified in these sections.) While all of the information in the claims is relevant, of particular significance insofar as this appeal is
concerned is the priority of the claims appellant submitted
which can be generally grouped as follows:
1862
1864
1870
187 4
1878
1879
1886
1888
1892
1900
1902

-

57 claims
37 claims
143 claims
1 claim
5 claims
163 claims
125 claims
25 claims
73 claims
115 claims
22 claims

(The remaining claims bear priorities from 1916 to
1960 ;rncl are based upon applications to appropriate filed
in the office of the State Engineer, or upon adverse use.)
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We wculd like to point out that the document entitled
'
"Response of the United States", which was submitted by
appellant \'.-ith its wat~r user's claims and quoted on pages
3 and 4 of appellant's brief, was not a water user's claim.
This document appears to be a statement of various legal
theories by which apj_)ellant asserts it can acquire a water
right but does not purport to describe any specific water
right.
In accordance with Section 73-4-11, U. C. A., 1953, the
State Engineer prepared and submitted to the District
Court and the \vater users a Proposed Determination of
Water Rights. (Volumes 5 and 6 of the record.) All of
appellant's claims \ve1·e incorporated into the proposed determination, by the State Engineer, setting forth the information as it was contained in the claim. In each and
every case the proposed determination states the origin of
the right proposed. For those rights which were based on
the beneficial use of water prior to 1903, the appellant
claimed and was awarded a diligence right based upon the
use of the water by its permittees, licencees and lessees. In
other cases, the rights were based upon applications filed
in the office of the State Engineer, and in some instances
upon adverse use. The appellant did not object to these
awards as being incorrect nor offer evidence of any uses
in addition to those contained in the proposed determina·
tion.
After being served with the proposed determination as
provided for in Section 73-4-11, U. C. A., 1953, the appel·
lant filed a protest which, among other things, objected
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to the fact that no rights were awarded appellant under
the reservation theory. Simply stated, this theory is based
on the proposition that the reservation of federal lands impliedly reserves the water needed to carry out the purpose
for which the land was reserved.
In answer to the protest of the appellant, which is
quoted on page 5 of appellant's brief, the State Engineer
stated:
"In answer to paragraph 8 of said protest, the
State Engineer admits that the proposed determination does not recognize any water rights for this
protestant beyond those set forth in said determination; denies that protestant has any water rights
in this area, except those set forth in said determination; the State Engineer further alleges that protestant is required to assert specifically all the
rights to the use of water from this source to which
it is entitled but has not filed water user's claims
for any uses except those contained in said determination."
Still appellant filed nothing in the way of a water user
claim based upon this theory, nor did appellant submit any
rviclence at the trial that it was entitled to any specific
wat21· which was not already .covered in the claims theretofore submitted. Further, the record does not even show
~111y evidence of the reservations which appellant now
quotes in its brief on page 4 as the basis of the right. There
m:is no evidence submitted by the appellant relative to the
purposes for which the land was reserved, nor that there
is any water used for reservation purposes or that appel-

lant will in the future require any additional water from
any of the sources here being adjudicated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DECREE OF THE DISTRICT COURT, IN
CONFORNIANCE vVITH SECTION 73-4-12, U
C. A., 1953, AW ARDS TO APPELLANT ALL
OF THE RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER TO
WHICH APPELLANT ESTABLISHED A
RIGHT IN THIS ADJUDICATION PROCEEDING.
A.

THE PLEADINGS APPELLANT FILED
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT DO NOT
ALLEGE ANY CLAIM TO THE USE OF
WATER UNDER THE RESERVATION
THEORY.

The gist of appellant's argument, as we understand
it, is that the decree of the District Court is correct as far
as it goes, but it should also contain a statement that ap·
pellant has rights to the water on the lands which have
been reserved for national forests. We are not certain
from appellant's brief whether it is claiming that the water
which was awarded by the court decree should have also
been awarded under the reservation theory, or whether it
is claiming the right to additional waters from this source.
Therefore, we will discuss both propositions. In order to
properly evaluate appellant's position, we must review the
purpose and scope of these proceedings.
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The complete procedure for a general adjudication
action, from the initiation through to the final judgment
by the court, is provided for in Chapter 4 of Title 73, U.
C. A., 1953. The legislature has set out the exclusive manner in which a right to the use of water may be asserted
in this type of proceeding. Section 73-4-5, U. C. A., 1953,
provides:
"Each person claiming a right to use any water
of such river system or water source shall, within
ninety days after the completed service of notice
of completion of survey prescribed by section 73-43 hereof, file in the office of the clerk of the district
court a statement in writing which shall be signed
and verified by the oath of the claimant, and shall
include as near as may be the following: The name
and post-office address of the person making the
claim; the nature of the use on which the claim of
appropriation is based; the flow of water used in
cu bk feet per second or the quantity of water
stored in acre-feet, and the time during which it
has been used each year; the name of the stream or
other source from which the water is diverted, the
point on such stream or source where the water is
diverted, and the nature of the diverting works; the
date when the first work for diverting the water
was begun, and the nature of such work; the date
when the water was first used, the flow in cubic
feet per second or the quantity of water stored in
ac1·e-feet, and the time during which the water was
used the first year; and the place and manner of
present use; and such other facts as will clearly define the extent and nature of the appropriation
claimed, or as may be required by the blank form
which shall be furnished by the State Engineer under the direction of the court."
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The individual water users claims become the plead.
ings in the adjudication. Section 73-4-14, U. C. A., 1953,
states:
"The statements filed by the claimants shall
stand in the place of pleadings, and issues may be
made thereon."
In the case of Mammoth Canal & Irr. Co. v. Burton,
70 Utah 239, 259 P. 408 (1927) which involved an adjudi·
cation of water rights under this statute, this court rec·
ognized that "* * * the familiar rules of practice and
procedure by whid1 the courts are guided in ordinary law.
suits do not apply in such cases where the legislature has
laid down other and different rules relative to a particular
subject". We submit that the only manner by which a
claimant in this proceedings can assert his claim to water
is by substantial compliance with the above procedure.
However, it should be observed that the procedure for
pleading a water right under the above sections is not
greatly different from any action between two parties to
quiet title to water. The person claiming the right to water
must establish with certainty the various elements whkh
go to make up a water right. As stated by this court in
Hardy v. Beaver Co. Irr. Co., 65 Utah 28, 234 P. 524
(1924) :
"None of the respondents claim to have used
the water throughout the winter season, and with·
out exception such evidence as was offered by the
several respondents in support of their respective
claims is wholly insufficient in respect to the quan·
tity used and period of use to satisfy that degree of
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certainty which is required to establish priorities
to the use of the public waters of the state and to
enable the court, by its decree, to establish the respective rights of the parties to the use of the common resource. As was said by this .court in the case
of Sharp v. Whitmore, 51 Utah 14, 19, 168 P. 273,
at 274:
"'One of the essentials of a valid judgment is
that the judgment be definite and certain respecting the relief granted. In judgments defining and
determining conflicting claims, rights, and interests in and to the use of water in this arid region,
the application of the foregoing rule is indispensable. The rule, the soundness of which is self-evident, is so well established that it would be a work
of supererogation to cite authorities illustrating
and supporting it.'
"It is but stating the corollary of the foregoing
pronouncement to add that it is equally incumbent
upon claimants in actions of this kind to prove the
extent of their appropriations both in time and
amount with the same degree of certainty. Sowards
v. Meagher, 37 Utah 222; Walsh v. Wallace, 26 Nev.
299, 67 P. 914, 918, 99 Am. St. Rep. 692."

Appellant did not file a single water users claim based
on the so-called "reservation theory". This is apparent
when one reviews the claims. However, before discussing
these claims in detail we would like to emphasize that the
document entitled, "Response of the United States" which
appellant quotes on pages 3 and 4 of its brief is not a water
users claim. This document can be construed as nothing
more than an allegation of various legal theories by which
the appellant claims it can acquire water rights. In effect
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it was submitted as a letter of transmittal to accompany
the 715 specific claims which were filed. Further, the record before this court does not contain any of the evidence
relative to the reservation of lands for forest purposes
which is set forth on page 4 of appellant's brief. The rights
of the parties are to be determined from the record that
is before this court, 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error § 491.
Turning now to the specific water users' claims which
were originally filed, plus those subsequently submitted, we
would like to point out certain facts which we consider relevant to this appeal. Paragraph 4 of each statement of
water users' claim contains the user's declaration of the
origin of the water right claimed. All of appellant's claims
assert a right acquired pursuant to state law and make no
reference to the reservation theory. In those cases where
the water was put to a beneficial use prior to 1903 the appellant claimed and was awarded a diligence right. These
rights rest on proof of an appropriation of the water to a
beneficial use prior to the 1903 date, Yardley v. Swapp, 12
Utah 2d 146, 364 P. 2d 4 ( 1961). In this regard it is significant that the priorities of the majority of the claims
filed by appellant predate the earliest date of withdrawal
of land for forest purposes, according to the statements of
withdrawal of these lands in appellant's brief. We wish
to make it clear that we deny that the statements in ap·
pellant's brief can now be considered as evidence of a
water right under the reservation theory. Certainly ap·
pellant cannot seriously contend that these rights were also
reserved with a priority ahead of the date of the reserva·
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tion of the land. If water was reserved at the time of the
withdrawal of the land it would have to take the priority
of the date of the reservation, Arizona v. California, 376
U. S. 340 (1964) : and United States v. Walker River Irr.
D1:st., 104 F. 2d 334 (1939).
With regard to the remaining diligence claims none of
the priorities claimed correspond with the dates appellant
now asserts for the reservation of the land for forest purposes. The remaining claims of the appellant, with priorities subsequent to 1903, are either based on applications
filed in the office of the State Engineer or upon adverse
use. When the rights of appellant were set forth in the proposed determination of water rights by the State Engineer,
he listed the source and type of right proposed. In the case
of each claim by appellant the right is shown as being
vested under state law. The appellant did not protest these
awards, but simply stated in its protest that it was entitled
to rights based upon the reservation theory; to which the
State Engineer answered that appellant "* * * has
not filed water users' claims for any uses except those contained in said determination." (See paragraph 7 of the
answer of the State Engineer.) We respectfully submit
that appellant has not filed any pleading which would form
the basis of an award for an additional water right in this
adjudication proceedings.
B.

THE PROPOSED DETERMINATION AND
THE DECREE OF THE DISTRICT COURT
ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
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UPON WHICH THE COURT COULD BASE
THE AWARD OF AN ADDITIONAL
WATER RIGHT TO APPELLANT IN THIS
PROCEEDINGS.
Appellant did not offer any evidence which would support the right which is now claimed. The only evidence
which the record shows was before the trial court was the
water user's claims and the proposed determination. Section 73-4-14, supra, provides that the water user's claims
shall be competent evidence of the facts stated therein unless the same are put in issue. As we have pointed out
above, the claims of the appellant were evidence of rights
acquired according to state law. This is also reflected in
the proposed determination; and if we correctly assess appellant's position, it does not question these awards. Rather,
it would assert that the same right should again be awarded
to it under the reservation theory. The obvious conclusion
is that since the majority of rights claimed were already
vested there was nothing further appellant could acquire
with regard to these specific awards. However, if appellant was seeking a right based on the reservation theory
it would be essential to prove: the area covered by the
reservation; what, if any water was intended to be reserved; the quantity, priority, point of diversion, place and
nature of use of the water. In other words, it would be
necessary to submit some evidence of the right claimed.
Certainly, no court could formulate a decree defining a
water right without this information. Again it is obvious
from the record there was not sufficient evidence before
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the court upon which it could make a finding. Appellant
was not in any way limited in its proof, and if it had additional claims it was required to prove them. In this regard we believe the report of the Special Master, in Arizona
v. California, 373 U. S. 546 (1963) dated December 5, 1960,
is particularly significant. 1 His findings and decree formed
the basis of the ruling from the United States Supreme
Court upon which appellant now so heavily relies. On page
334 of the report in discussing the daims of the United
States under the reservation theory, the Master stated:
"With the exception of the Gila National Forest, it is unnecessary to pass on the claims of the
United States for water for any of the other nine
federal establishments, because the United States
has not demonstrated, except as to the Gila National
Forest, that it presently utilizes or requires water
from the mainstream of the Gila or its interstate
tributaries in order to carry out the purposes of
these establishments. Nor has the United States
demonstrated, again excepting the Gila National
Forest, that it will in the future require water from
these sources. There is, therefore, no controversy
over uses by these federal establishments to be adjudicated. Certainly it would be inappropriate to
adjudicate the claims of the United States (with
the exception noted) at this time since those claims
may never be exercised much less questioned. Moreover, it would be impossible on the basis of this
record to determine the water rights of the United
States (except for the Gila National Forest) either
on the basis of state law or on the basis of federal
reservation of water."
1

A copy of this report oan be found in the library adjacent to the
offices of the Utah Water and Power Board, Room 435, State Capitol.
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In an early decision this court announced that it would
not reverse a decision which conformed to the pleading and
evidence presented to the trial court, Gunnison Irr. Co. v.
Gunnison H. C. Co., 52 Utah 347, 174 P. 852 (1918):
"There is another and even more elementary
reason why the respondent's contention cannot prevail. This case was tried to the court below under
pleadings drawn, evidence heard, and findings, conclusions, and decree made solely under the theory
of acquisition of rights to the use of water under
the doctrine of appropriation for beneficial use.
Upon the part of all parties the suit was a simple
suit to quiet title to the usufruct under such theory.
In no way whatever did the case as pleaded and
tried involve any element either of title to the corpus of water, or right to change the mode of enjoyment from that of direct irrigation to that of storage for use from time to time as crops require. To
sustain the position of respondent upon this appeal,
it would be necessary to hold that the trial court
in its decision departed from the path marked out
by the pleadings. The record does not justify such
a conclusion. But even if the trial court had so departed from the issues, the legal effect of its decree
would be limited to the issues raised by the pleadings. Vicksburg v. Henson, 231 U. S. 259, 34 Sup.
Ct. 95, 58 L. Ed. 209, at 216."
We respectfully submit that based upon the evidence
in this case appellant has not proved that it is entitled to
any additional awards in this proceeding.
The decree of the court, in confirming the claims in
the proposed determination, awarded to appellant all the
rights to the use of water to which it was entitled. Section
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73-4-15, U. C. A., 1953 specifically states that after a hearing judgment shall be entered as provided for in Section
73-4-12, U. C. A., 1953. This latter section of the statute
provides that the court will enter judgment:

"* * * whkh shall determine and establish

the rights of the several claimants to the use of the
water of said river system or water source; and
among other things it shall set forth the name and
post-office address of the person entitled to the use
of the water; the quantity of water in acre-feet or
the flow of water in second-feet; the time during
·which the water is to be used each year; the name
of the stream or other source from which the water
is diverted; the point on the stream or other source
from which the water is diverted; the priority date
of the right; and such other matters as will fully
and completely define the rights of said claimants
to the use of the water."
This court has stated the findings must set forth the
information required by this statute, Plain City Irr. Co. v.
Hooper Irr. Co., 87 Utah 545, 51 P. 2d 1069 (1935). The
decree in this action fully complies with the requirements
of this section of the code, and awards to appellant all of
the water the evidence shows that it has a right to use.
The fact that appellant may sometime in the future have
additional uses of water does not present the court with a
basis for a determination of what those rights may be. The
above quoted statute specifically states that the judgment
shall reflect the claimant's right to the use of the water,
not some possible or potential use. This court has on numerous occasions held that the nature of a general determination proceedings, is, in effect, a determination of the
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present rights to the use of water. It is not a determination of uses which may in the future come into existence;
rather its purpose is to settle and determine in one decree
the present existing rights and uses of the parties. In
Smith v. District Court of Second Judicial District for Mor.
gan County, 69 Utah 493, 256 P. 539 ( 1927) at p. 501 of
the Utah Reporter, the court after making a review of the
general adjudication statute stated:
"After a most careful and thorough examination of the statute in question we have been unable
to find any warrant for the court in such action
to undertake to determine any question except
rights to the use of the water involved and, perhaps, as a necessary corollary injunctive relief for
the protection of such rights after they have been
adjudicated and determined. No provision appears
to have been made for cross-actions for any further
or different relief than the determination of such
rights."
In a subsequent de·cision the court again took occasion
to point out what is contemplated in a general determination action, Mammoth Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Burton, 70
Utah 239, 259 P. 408 (1927) at pp. 249 and 250 of the Utah
Reporter:
"The terms 'general determination,' as used in
this section and elsewhere in the statute, as we understand them, without attempting an exact definition, connote a determination of all rights within
the system or other source existing at the time that
the court is called upon to act or when the decree
is made, and which is based upon the surveys and
investigations made by the state engineer that are
provided for in the statute, and made in an action
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conducted under and substantially in conformity
with that law."
The Utah Court in Huntsville Irrigation Association
v. Distl'ict Court of Weber County, 72 Utah 431, 270 P.
1090 ( 1928) disc used these adions in terms of present existing uses of water.
"As stated in effect in the passage last quoted,
the old system of trying such cases by piecemeal had
proved ineffectual in many cases and was in the
highest degree unsatisfactory. The intent of the
Legislature and the purpose of the statute apparently was to remedy the evil then existing in determining the rights of parties in this class of cases.
The statute provides no remedy for any relief except the determination of rights to the use of water
and as a necessary corollary thereto such injunctive relief as may be necessary to protect and enforce such rights." (Emphasis added.)
Viewed in light of the above statements by this court
concerning the result to be accomplished in a general determination action, we submit that there is no issue presented on this appeal. Appellant was awarded the rights
to the use of water requested in its water user's claims.
Clearly there is nothing more contemplated in a general
determination action. If appellant were seeking relief because the trial court denied a claim for an existing use of
water, there would then be some grounds for appeal. However, we are hard put to see how a water user who is
awarded rights for all of the uses which are claimed upon
the theory which he claimed them can now find cause to
appeal to this court. Appellant makes no claim that it
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should not be awarded the uses ·which it claims under state
law. In addition to assertions made in the individual water
user's claims, the very document which appellant asserts
as its claim to water based on the reservation theory states:
"* * * the United States bases its claims upon appropriations made unde1 Utah law and also upon such other
rights under Utah law as may be valid * * * "
C.

APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A DETERMINATION BY THIS COURT OF
RIGHTS UNDER THE RESERVATION
THEORY PRESENTS TO THIS COURT
AN ABSTRACT, MOOT ISSUE.

In light of the pleadings, evidence and decree of the
court in this action, we submit that appellant is requesting
this court to determine a question of law in advance of a
right be asserted or contested. It would be just as logical
for appellant to request this court to rule on whether or
not it has or may have rights by reason of its treaty making powers, its requirements for flood control and navigation, and any other applicable rights and povvers under the
Constitution of the United States and the Acts of Congress.
All of these possibilities are stated in the "Response of the
United States'', which appellant contends raises the reser·
vation question.
\i'Ve urge that appellant's contention that it should be

awarded water rights under the reservation theory comes
within the rule that courts on appeal will not consider moot,
abstrad questions on appeal.
"The term 'moot' as used in connection with
cases or questions which the courts refuse to review
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as merely academic has been variously defined to
include cases in which determination is sought of
an abstract question which does not rest upon existing facts or rights, cases or questions as to which
in reality there is no actual controversy existing,
cases in which the rights in contest have expired
by lapse of time, cases as to which no judgment
rendered could be carried into effect, and cases
which seek a decision in advance about a right, before it has been actually asserted and contested. 5
Am,, Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error § 762."
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Allis-Chalmers Workers
Union, Local 248, 32 N. W. 2d 190 (1948) gives a good
definition of the proposition which appellant is seeking to
advance in this case :
"A moot case has been defined as one which
seeks to determine an abstract question which does
not rest upon existing facts or rights, or which
seek a judgment in a pretended controversy when
in reality there is none, or one which seeks a decision in advance about a right before it has actually
been asserted or contested, or a judgment upon
some matter which when rendered for any cause
cannot have any practical legal effect upon the existing controversy."
To decide the question as appellant proposes would
fall squarely within the prohibition of the above announced
rule of law. With the great quantity of land in Utah under
Federal ownership a question that has the far-reaching
effects of appellant's claim under the reservation theory
certainly should not be decided as an abstract proposition
in this action.
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D.

THE AW ARDS TO NEBEKER UNDER
WATER USER'S CLAIMS NOS. 265, 2716,
2718 AND 2719 DO NOT CONFLICT WITH
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR'S
ADMINISTRATION OF LANDS UNDER
THE TAYLOR GRAZING ACT.

Finally we urge that it was not error for the District
Court to award to Nebeker the use of water under Claims
Nos. 265, 2716, 2718 and 2719. None of the cases which
appellant cites so hold. The cases of United States v. Cox,
190 F. 2d 293 (1951); Osborne v. United States, 145 F. 2d
292 (1944); and LaRue v. Udall, 324 F. 2d 428 (1963)., all
dealt with the government's right to take the land used by
the permittees for other purposes. In each case the right of
the government to take the land for the new use was upheld,
and the permittee was not considered to have any vested
property right in the public lands; but none of these cases
dealt with water or water rights problems. However, we do
not contend that this proceeding binds the Secretary of the
Interior in his administration of federal lands. As we have
previously discussed in this brief, this is solely an adjudication of existing uses to water and certainly it cannot be
construed as adjudicating any right to federal lands. Appellant asserts that the alleged error in regard to these
awards could be solved by merely an inclusion of a provision in the decree which would state that the Nebeker
rights are subject to all authority of the Secretary of the
Interior under the Taylor Grazing Act. We submit that
insofar as this administration of federal lands is concerned,
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this action does not purport to govern the Secretary of the
Interior in his administration of the lands under the Taylor
Grazing Act. Further, there was no evidence presented
to the trial court of any conflicting claims of appellant's
permittees to these sources. If a dispute to the use of these
sources arises in the future, it will have to be resolved at
that time.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the water user's claims submitted by appellant the decree of the trial court properly awards the
rights covered by these claims to appellant as being acquired under state law. Appellant did not plead or prove
a right to the use of any water in excess of the rights contained in the proposed determination. Further, appellant
failed to demonstrate that the decree of the District Court
purports to interfere with the administration of federal
lands by the Secretary of the Interior. Therefore, the decree of the District Court should be affirmed.
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